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Slouching Toward Constitutional Duty: The
Legislative Veto and the Delegation of
Authority
Stanley C Brubaker*
On the 23rd of June, 1983, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a section of the Immigration and Nationalization
Act authorizing the legislative veto.I On that day, in that single
decision, the Court implied the unconstitutionality of more provisions in more federal laws than in all its other decisions combined
smce 1789.2 With such an impact, the decision's reasoning should
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. My thanks to Jeffrey
Tulis and Barry Warren for their co=ents on an earlier draft of this article. Support for
the research was provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities.
I. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). Jagdish
Rai Chadha, an East Indian, had applied for and received from the Attorney General of
the United States, pursuant to§ 244(a)( I) of the I=igration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(l) (1976), an exception from§ 242(b) of that Act, which would have mandated
his deportation for having overstayed his noni=igrant student visa. The Attorney General's action had legal effect only if neither House of Congress voted a resolution of disapproval. Along with 339 other cases that were excepted from § 242(b), Chadha's case was
reviewed by the House Committee on the Judiciary and was one of six found by the Committee (contrary to the Attorney General's opinion) not to have met the "statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship." 121 CoNG. REC. 40800 (1975), quoted in 103
S. Ct. at 2771. Accepting the Co=ittee's recommendation, the House passed the resolution of disapproval without a recorded vote.
In Chadha, the legislative veto reversed an exception to the operation of the law; thus.
as a direct consequence an injury befell Chadha, that is, he was ordered deported. Much
more typically, a legislative veto prevents a governmental action, thus making it difficult to
identify any individual who is directly injured.
That the Court was intent on following the logic of Chadha to its limits was shown on
July 6. 1983, when it su=arily affirmed two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). One (Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America, No. 81-2008) struck down a requirement that the Federal Energy
Regulatory Co=ission submit to legislative review any proposal for the decontrol of fuel;
either house could "veto" the proposal. The other (U.S. St:nate v. FTC, No. 82-935) found
unconstitutional the legislative veto provision of the Feder<>.! Trade Co=ission Improvements Act, requiring the FTC to submit to legislative review any proposed "final rule." A
concurrent resolution of disapproval was necessary to veto the proposal.
As Justice White argued in his solitary dissent from these decisions (103 S. Ct. 3556,
3557-58), distinctions could be drawn between these cases and Chadha as a) they involved
independent regulatory agencies over which the president has little control, and b) the
second case involved a two-House veto.
2. Estimates vary, but the Justice Department, somewhat more conservatively than
others, has reported that the Court's decision in effect overturned 207 legislative veto provi-

81

82

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 1:81

be extraordinarily cogent, written with great care for precise characterization of the veto as well as close analysis of its purpose and
effect. Coming to the opinion with such an expectation, one is
bound to be disappointed and must be left with a sense of wonder
at the disproportion between the force of the reasoning and the
extent of its consequences. I shall suggest, however, that these
consequences can be justified, but only on a ground that the opinion failed to articulate and that has major implications for administrative law----one that requires revitalization of the moribund
nondelegation doctrine.
I.

THE CASE FOR THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

The legislative veto conditions a delegation of legislative authority upon a later judgment by Congress3 on whether a rule or
act implementing that delegation conforms to congressional intent.4 Generally statutes containing a legislative veto provision require that the president or agency head submit to Congress rules
or actions designed to implement that legislation; within a stated
period-usually 30 or 60 days, though some are as short as 15
days or as long as 120 dayss--Congress may either acquiesce in
the proposal or vote a simple resolution of disapproval. Power to
cast this "veto" is usually given to one or both branches of the
legislature, though it has occasionally been vested in a single congressional committee.6 If this vote on the resolution fails, or as is
more common, Congress passively acquiesces in the administration's proposal, it becomes law.
This method of qualifying legislative authority originated in
the Executive Reorganization Act of 1932, permitting the president to reorganize the Executive Branch subject to disapproval of
sions in 126 different laws. N.Y. Times. July 2, 1983. at Al9. Because of different criteria,
studies also vary on the number of laws the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional.
Professor Abraham's careful study indicated 122 provisions of federal laws declared unconstitutional as of the 1980 term. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND fRANCE 305-10
(4th ed. 1980).
3. Legislative-veto provisions do not require adherence to the normal requirements
of bicameral support and presentation to the president. as required by Art. I, § 7.
4. Provisions exist calling for a congressional vote of approval before proposals or
acts become lawful, and some (e.g., Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455, 456 (1979)) have also called
these requirements for affirmative approval "legislative vetoes." I will reserve the term
"legislative veto" to affirmative acts that have the effect of negating proposals.
5. Javits & Klein, supra note 4, at 456. The veto period in Chadha was extraordinarily long, authorizing Congress to disapprove the recommendations of the Attorney General
any time during the session in which they were submJtted to Congress or the next sessiOn.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(c)(2).
6. See J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 213-38 (1964).
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his plans by either House of Congress within sixty days of its submission, 1 and for the rest of that decade, legislative veto provisions were confined to legislation of this genre. 8 In the next two
decades use of the legislative veto spread, as Congress sought to
maintain control over power that it had delegated to the president
during World War II and the Cold War. During the sixties and
seventies, the device became more common and its character
changed. Its most popular use was to curb the "imperial" president through tighter controls on his use of military force, 9 foreign
aid, 10 and budgetary discretion.11 Of even greater significance, at
least numerically, was its spread to control rule-making by administrative agencies;12 indeed, since the mid-seventies there have
been several proposals to make the authority to exercise the legislative veto a standard qualification to all administrative rulemaking.I3
Although the legislative veto does not appear to fit the pristine concept of separation of powers, a strong argument can be
made that it does serve constitutional ends.l4 To start, it should
be noted that the Constitution itself embodies an impure conception of the separation of powers and that this very impurity was
designed to serve ends that the framers thought essential to good
government: balance, energy, and accountability. In the name of
balance, the system employs checks and balances to achieve an
equilibrium making it unlikely that one branch of government
7. Act of June 30. 1932. ch. 314. § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414.
8. Brief histories of congressional use of the "veto" are found in Fisher, Introduction, in CONGRESSIONAl RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO 1-15 (L. Fisher ed.) (Comm. Print 1980) (hereinafter cited as STUDIES
ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETo); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of
Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REv. 253, 256-62 (1982); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A
Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983, 1002-29 (1975).
Although Watson traces the legislative veto provisions to 1895, id. at 1003, I am following
the conventional wisdom by starting with 1932.
9. War Powers Resolution. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555,556-57 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544) (1976)).
10. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-329, § 211,90 Stat. 729, 743 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(l) (Supp. V 1981)).
II. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35 (codified at 2 U.S.C.S. § 684 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp.
1983)).
12. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(l) (Supp. V 1981) (education); 2 U.S.C. § 438(d)(2)
(campaign financing) (Supp. V 1981); 49 U.S.C. § 1552(f)(3) (airline deregulation) (Supp.
v 1981).
13. E.g., H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNG. REc. 31,615-24, 31,668-69
(1976).
14. See, e.g., Dry, The Congressional Veto and the Constitutional Separation ofPowers,
in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAl ORDER 195-233 (J. Bessette & J. Tulis eds.
1981).
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could oppress the others or that any group, including a majority,
could grasp the instruments of government to oppress the rest. In
the name of energy, the president was given the leading role in
foreign affairs-even when that involved the arguably legislative
task of negotiating a treaty-and an influential role in the legislative process through his veto power and his obligation to recommend to the legislature "measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient." Is And in the name of accountability, the framers constructed a deliberately impure and complex legislative process involving both Houses of Congress and the executive. They sought
to avoid a system overly responsive either to the potentially narrow and basely selfish "will of all" embodied in the legislature or
to a "general will" which could too easily be confused in the executive's mind with his own vainglory.
One of the most frequently acclaimed virtues of this scheme
is its flexibility, its ability to generate or accept adaptations to situations whose precise nature the framers could not foresee. The
legislative veto, some say,t6 is such an adaptation to such a
situation.
We are probably in greater need of being reminded that our
contemporary situation resembles the framers' vision than that it
differs, yet there is substantial truth in the cliche that the framers'
Constitution has ushered into being a society of such interdependence and complexity that only dimly at best could they have foreseen its outline.t? It is a situation in which it is necessary for
Congress to act, yet it is impossible for Congress to act with the
sort of detailed legislation congressmen were accustomed to writing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The solution, of
course, was to delegate legislative authority to the executive and to
independent regulatory agencies-a course of action that was
made more palatable by the ideas of "scientific management" and
a neutral bureaucracy.ts
This solution did serve the constitutional end of energy and
efficiency, but, especially as it was realized that scientific management and neutral bureaucracy were illusions, at the cost of accountability and balance. In the late sixties and early seventies,
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
\6. See, e.g., Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (\977); Javits & Klein, supra
note 4.
17. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note \6, at 328.
\8. Fisher & Moe, Presidential Reorganization Authority: Is it Worth the Cost?, 96
PoL. SCI. Q. 301 (1981).
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we were told that the president had become "imperial,"l9 confusing the general will with his personal image of glory, and more
basely, with his own re-election. Even more distant from the ken
of the framers was the rise of an entrenched bureaucracy with its
own interests, its own visions of the good life, and with substantial
authority to make law, for much of which it was accountable, realistically, neither to the Congress nor to the president.
In this situation, Congress faced an apparent dilemma. It
could continue to delegate, furthering energy and efficiency at the
expense of balance and accountability, or it could maintain balance and accountability while sacrificing energy and efficiency to
such an extent that areas demanding governance would remain
ungoverned. Even if one believes that the scale of contemporary
government could be trimmed dramatically, the contrast between
the 350 bills typically enacted by Congress and the 7,000 rules and
amended rules listed in the Federal Register in a single year2o suggests that the dilemma is at least partly real.
The legislative veto, it is argued, is a permissible constitutional adaptation, enabling Congress to escape this unforeseeable
dilemma.21 By delegating a qualified authority, Congress can
maintain the system's energy, while by reserving authority to review proposed rules and acts, it can restore balance and accountability.22 In short, the legislative veto is an attractive device, and
far from violating the ends of the separation of powers, it appears
to render those ends possible in a changed environment.
The veto also survives more technical arguments concerning
the means of separation of powers, including those of the majority
in Chadha. The force of these arguments largely depends upon a
characterization of the proposed rule or act that Congress reviews
as "law." But the very terms of the legislative veto provisions state
that the proposal or act does not have the status of law until after
the period of time has elapsed during which Congress has the opportunity to review it. The majority's contrary characterization is
therefore bafiling. It is said that the legislative veto interferes with
the executive branch's authority to implement the law by unconstitutionally restricting its choice of means, as well as its authority
to determine the meaning of legislation, subject to later review by
the courts. But if the proposal is not yet law, it can hardly be said
19. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Miller & Knapp.
The Congressional Veto: Preserving tire Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367. 377
(1977).
20.
21.
22.

See Abourezk, supra note 16, at 323.
See, e.g., Dry, supra note 14, at 228.
/d. at 201-02.
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that Congress is interfering with the executive's authority to implement the law. Moreover, there can be no claim that the substance of the restrictions effected by the legislative veto encroaches
upon some inherent executive prerogative,23 for there is no question that Congress, if it had the time, could legislate with as much
detail as is given through the 7,000 rules and amended rules written annually by administrators. A more realistic criticism of the
effect of the legislative veto is that it affronts the dignity of the
executive branch by obliging it to develop rules, without any guarantee that these rules can be placed into effect.24 While accurate,
this criticism does not rise to constitutional significance, for there
is little reason to doubt that Congress has the authority, through
the normal legislative process, to require executive bodies to submit proposals for the legislature to consider.
Some critics say the legislative veto interferes with the presidential authority to veto legislative proposals. The president does
have authority to veto all legislative acts, with very few explicit2s
23. Abourezk., supra note 16, at 328-30. The idea of executive prerogative, of course.
more commonly refers to presidential authority that can be exercised independently of
legislative action, such as presidential authority to remove executive officers, Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Legislative action restricting such a prerogative would
be unconstitutional regardless of the form it took, whether that be ordinary legislation, a
concurrent resolution, a two-thirds override of a presidential veto. or a legislative veto.
Between presidential authority that is entirely dependent on legislation and authority
that is entirely independent of legislative action lies what Justice Jackson called the "zone
of twilight," Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952), where the
President and Congress may have concurrent authority. It would be convenient to agree
with Justice Black in his opinion of the Court in Youngstown that the zone simply does not
exist, a position affirmed by Professor Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining
Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal
Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 102 ( 1976 ): either the President
has a prerogative essential to his executive function or his authority depends entirely upon
legislative authorization. But the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown. it
must be admitted, has considerable force.
Only a small minority oflegislative veto provisions can even arguably be placed in this
zone (conceivably, e.g., the impoundment provision of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. 1403, and the troop removal provision of the
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. 1544). But here the case against the legislative veto
cannot be dismissed as casually as in the text above, because the veto attempts more than
simply to prevent a proposed act from becoming law; it seeks to block presidential action
that would be legitimate in the absence of congressional action. Because the veto here does
have the purpose and effect of legislation, it would seem unconstitutional for failing to meet
the requirements of bicameralism and presentation to the President; that is, in these unusual instances, the legislative veto would be unconstitutional for the reasons articulated by
Chief Justice Burger in Chadha.
24. See Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423 (1978).
25. Authority to initiate impeachments (U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6); authority to
conduct trial following impeachment (art. I, § 3, cl. 7); authority to approve or disapprove
presidential appointments (art II, § 2, cl. 2); authority to ratify or refuse to ratify treaties
negotiated by the president (art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
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and implicit26 exceptions, which would have the effect of law, and
the framers were careful to ensure that legislative proposals could
not slip by the executive authority merely by being called something other than a bill.27 But the legislative veto does not prevent
anything from coming before the president that would have the
effect of law or that would rescind law;2s it merely prevents what
has the potential of law from achieving the actuality of law. Also,
although no president can permanently yield to Congress the inherent authority of his office, it is not without significance that the
law containing the authorization of the legislative veto was
presented to him in accordance with the Constitution.29
Another theory is that Congress improperly performs an essentially judicial function in employing the legislative veto, since
its object is to ensure that proposals conform to the intention of
the law. Conceivably, the veto could be used in a manner that is
essentially judicial, as when instead of determining what rules
should be devised to implement a policy, Congress determines
whether these rules apply in discrete circumstances. Justice Powell argues persuasively3o that this is what happened in Chadha, as
Congress did attempt to determine whether the 340 aliens whose
deportation orders were suspended by the Attorney General met
"statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship."3I
But in its characteristic use, reviewing rules that would have the
effect of law unless vetoed by Congress, the legislative veto seems
invulnerable to this charge. First, since what the legislature reviews is not yet law, the review could displace the judicial function only if the judiciary had authority to render advisory
opinions.32 Second, judicial review of administrative actions is
supposed to follow the rule of the "clear mistake,"33 that is, law is
to be declared void only if the administrative agency has clearly
26. These relate to powers incidental to the effective performance of the legislative
function, such as authority to investigate, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 ( 1927), or to
cite and punish recalcitrant witnesses for contempt of Congress, Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
27. U.S. CoNST. art. I. § 7, cl. 3.
28. A possible exception arises when a concurrent resolution is deemed sufficient to
halt an ongoing policy. See. e.g.• Lease-Lend Act, Act of Mar. II, 1941, ch. II.§ 3(c), 55
Stat. 31-32 (codified before expiration at 22 U.S.C. § 412); Jackson, A Presidential Legal
Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353 (1953).
29. See, e.g., Dry. supra note 14, at 209.
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
31. See supra note I.
32. See. e.g.• Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp .. 333 U.S. 103
( 1948); Haybum's Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
33. See, e.g.• NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc .. 322 U.S. Ill (1944); Monaghan,
Marburv and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. I (1983).
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erred in its interpretation of the statute. Congressional review
does not duplicate or displace this function, as Congress examines
whether the proposal does conform to the actual intent. Third,
although some commentators call for a different approach,34 it remains the prevailing rule that the courts should refer to the congressional intent when the legislation was passed,3s not to what
that Congress would do if it were in session today or what the
current Congress would do if it were to consider the legislation.
As Senator Javits has emphasized, a distinguishing feature of the
legislative veto is that it permits Congress to review administrative
proposals "in accordance with a dynamic political intent based on
Congress's current interpretation of the public interest," ensuring
that legislation does "meet the test of current public interest as determined by Congress."36
Some contend that the legislative veto is itself a legislative
act, having the purpose and effect of amending or rescinding prior
legislation, but not following the established legislative route of
bicameral support and presentation to the executive. This is the
central point of Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in
Chadha. The basis for this characterization of the veto should be
scrutinized carefully since it undergirds the claims of encroachment on executive and judicial authority. The Chief Justice argues that the one-House veto "had the purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including
the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all
outside the legislative branch."3 7 But in what sense can there have
been rights and duties prior to the legislative veto? Only after the
expiration of the congressional review period were the Attorney
General's proposals to have vested rights in Chadha and duties in
governmental officials.3s A.1d if there were no rights and duties
antecedent to the legislative veto, the court cannot logically argue
that the legislative veto altered them.
The Chief Justice reiterates his characterization of the legislative veto as having the purpose and effect of full-fledged legislation by arguing that absent the iegislative veto provision, neither
House of Congress nor both of them acting together "could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the
Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated author34. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
35. The classic statement is found in E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 27-57 (1949).
36. Javits & Klein, supra note 4, at 473 (emphasis added).
37. \03 S. Ct. at 2784.
38. See Immigration and Nationality Act§ 244(c)(2).
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ity, had determined the alien should remain in the United States.
Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)(2), this could have
been achieved, if at all, only by legislation requiring deportation. "39 The short answer to this statement is that Congress did
not fully delegate authority to the Attorney General; it reserved
control over that authority by the inclusion of the legislative veto
provision.
Possible insight is given into the source of the Court's confusion by the following section of the opinion:
Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien whose deportation otherwise would
be cancelled under § 244. The one-House veto operated in this case to overrule
the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its
action has altered Chadha's status.40

There is a crucial ambiguity in the term "otherwise." It could
mean that Congress interfered, through the one-House veto, with
established rights or duties; that is, if Congress had not interfered,
the rights would still remain vested. Or the term can mean simply
that the choice is dichotomous: either Congress vetoes the provision or it does not; that is, if Congress had not acted, rights and
duties would have become vested. The first meaning forms the
premise of the Court's argument, and it may well be the more
common understanding of "otherwise," but the second correctly
states the process of the legislative veto: Congress can veto the
provision, "otherwise" it becomes law. Speculation on unarticulated steps of the Court's reasoning, of course, especially when one
considers the dynamics of group reasoning, 4 1 is an uncertain enterprise, but it seems that the Court first recognized that the
"otherwise" characterization of the legislative veto included an accurate description of the nature of the legislative veto and then
moved unconsciously from the accurate to the common but inaccurate understanding of the term.
This explanation of the Court's reasoning may not be plausible, but what are the other possibilities? One possibility concerns
the issue whether the provision authorizing the legislative veto
could be severed from the rest of the statute. The Court gave close
attention 4 2 to this question before it came to the merits of the legislative veto. Having concluded that the rest of the statute could
be fully operable without the legislative veto provision and that it
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2785 (footnotes omitted).
40. /d. at 2784-85 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
42. See 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76.
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was the intention of Congress for the rest of the statute to stand if
the legislative veto provision was found unconstitutional, the
Court perhaps regarded the statute as having the legislative veto
already severed from it, in which case the Attorney General's decision would have the status of law rather than a mere proposal.
Of course there is no reason to sever the provision unless it is
unconstitutional, but if we assume that it is then the Court's conclusion flows smoothly. If the legislative veto is severable and unconstitutional, then the Attorney General's proposal surely is law.
And if the proposal is law, there can be no doubt that the legislative veto effected a rescission or alteration of the law without
meeting the requirements of bicameralism and presentation! This
line of reasoning cannot be accused of merely begging the question-it also employs its answer. 43
In short, an attractive case can be made that the legislative
veto furthers rather than thwarts constitutional ends and does not
violate constitutional means-at least as these are commonly articulated44 and were articulated by the Supreme Court.
II.

/

THE CASE AGAINST THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

A central though not always express premise of the case for
the legislative veto is that it only allows Congress to achieve the
same sort of results that it would achieve if it had the time and
energy to write and approve the thousands of rules and acts done
each year by the administration in the implementation of the
law.4s Reviewing is not quite the same as writing and not all proposals can receive a close review (although the mere threat of the
veto is likely, it is said, to keep the administration close to the
intent behind the statute), so the results will be somewhat different
than if Congress itself legislated in detail, but the difference, according to this theory, is insubstantial.
How sound is this justification? To illustrate the difference
between the legislative process with and without the legislative
veto, we should first take a simple though abstract example-the
43. Where the provision for the legislative veto was insened into pre-existing legislation, as when the Congress sought greater control of the Federal Trade Commission (Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 2l(a), 94 Stat.
374,393 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l) (Supp. V 1981)), the Coun's argument has greater
plausibility, but no greater reality. When the Congress enacts such a provision it substantially changes the legal authority of the agency so that no proposal should be considered
law until the specified period of time passes without a legislative veto.
44. More effective criticisms have been offered by Manin, supra note 8, and Watson,
supra note 8.
45. See, e.g.. Abourezk, supra note 16, at 328-30.

1984]

LEGISLATIVE VETO

91

legislative package. Commonly, legislation will be a compromise
whose components have varying sorts and levels of support.46 Let
us assume that there are several components, each of which is opposed, though not vigorously, by a bare majority. In this situation, the legislature might a) oppose the package as a whole (likely
if the opposition majorities coincide), b) support the package as a
whole (likely if the opposition majorities do not coincide closely
and if the sentiment for provisions is more intense than the sentiment against), or c) support the package, if legislators know that
later they will have the opportunity to block implementation of
the offending provision through the legislative veto. The legislative veto would make no difference under the first possibility, but
would introduce telling differences under the last two possibilities.
If the package as a whole enjoys unconditional majority support
in the legislature (b), it will pass with or without the legislative
veto. In the implementation stage, however, without the legislative veto, each component will be implemented, but with the legislative veto, no component will be implemented. If the package as
a whole enjoys conditional support (c), then the bill would not
pass without the legislative veto but would pass with it. Although
the bill would pass with the legislative veto, at the implementation
stage, the result is the same as if it had failed to pass, for no component would be implemented. There is, however, an important
difference: with the legislative veto, Congress has signaled to the
public that it has taken action on a problem; without the veto, no
such pretense exists.
This example employs some unrealistic assumptions-for instance, that the legislation enjoys a high level of visibility from the
time of passage through its implementation, that the options for
implementing each component were apparent from the start and
brought forward without appreciable deviation by the administration, and that the preferences of the legislators remained constant
both in numbers and intensity. And the hypothetical structures of
support and opposition are not the most common ones. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that the legislative veto makes legislation easier to pass, but harder to implement-at least in
accordance with the intention implied by the terms of the bill.
As we introduce more realistic assumptions, these conclusions are rendered no less sound, but certainly more complex.
First, the administrative agency, interested in having its proposals
46. See, e.g., M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION; PUBLIC GooDS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43 n. 64, 121 (1965); A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 370-71 (1967).
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survive the threat of a legislative veto, is likely to work in concert
with Congress early in the development of any proposal.47 Second, since visibility and interest in the legislation will be lower at
the stage of implementation, and since a division of labor within
Congress must take place if it is to be effective in its control of the
administration, the most consequential work will be performed in
the committees and subcommittees.4s Third, since a major, if not
the major, incentive for congressmen in the selection of committees and subcommittees is the benefits that the position will allow
them to bring to their constituencies,49 the congressmen most involved with the development and review of the proposals will
have disproportionately more than other congressmen to gain or
lose. Thus a likely and apparently common occurrence is a significant skewing of the original legislative intent towards the interests of the congressmen on the overseeing committee or
subcommittee and the groups and people most responsible for
their re-electicn.so
Except in the minority of cases where the committee itself
exercises the veto,si the committee's threat to veto, of course, has
force only to the extent that there is good chance that the rest of
the House or Senate will support its decision. There is no guarantee of this, but given the limited time available to Congress and its
customary pattern of deference to its committees, the probability
is high enough to warrant the serious concern of an administrative
agency desirous of having its proposals become law and of avoiding adverse publicity. Less commonly noted, but in some ways
more consequential than the threat of the legislative veto, is the
promise of committee acquiescence. Its recommendation to veto
is ultimately dependent upon the will of its parent body, but as
Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn point out in their landmark
study, "Whenever [the oversight committee] does not report a veto
resolution to the floor of a house, the committee, with its narrow
47. See, e.g., Davis, Legislative Vetoes in Energy Policy, in STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO, supra note 8, at 107, 112. An administrative agency might attempt to develop
proposals, in accord with the original legislative intent, entirely aloof from the subcommittee overseeing it. but impasse between the agency and the subcommittee is then likely. See
Bruff & Gellhom, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1379 (1977).
48. See R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE
66 (1979); Bruff & Gellhom, supra note 47, at 1381-82.
49. SeeM. fiORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTABLISHMENT
62-67 (1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 85-97 (1974).
50. See Holliday, Export Administration Act: Legislative Veto Provisions, in STUDIES
ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO, supra note 8, at 321, 324.
51. Eg., Post Office Department Appropriations Act, 1971. See also J. HARRIS, supra
note 6, at 217-38.
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constituency, wields all of Congress' review power."s2 Their empirical study confirms our logical deductions: "the chief effect of
the veto power seems to be an increase in the power of congrei>sional committees and in the practice of negotiating over the substance of rules."s3
The policy process that I describe here, where law is in effect
made by an administrative agency, a committee or subcommittee,
and the narrow constituency most directly affected by the legislation and best organized to respond to it, is of course the commonly
noted iron triangle, or government by subsystem.s 4 This development preceded the proliferation of the legislative veto provisions,
some descriptions of its operation do not even make reference to
the legislative veto,ss and congressional committees do have other
tools for influencing administrative agencies towards their partial
concerns. Nevertheless, those who have studied these triangular
relations indicate that among the tools available to committees
and subcommittees, the power to acquiesce or recommend a veto
resolution is probably the most effective.s 6 In short, we seem fully
warranted in our conclusion that the veto facilitates a significant
distortion of the purpose of the law.
Another effect of the veto is to make administrative agencies
more responsive to the changing moods of Congress.s7 As mentioned above, the traditional rule is that administrative agencies
and courts should interpret and implement legislation in accordance with the intention of the legislature that did in fact pass ips
Some advocate a different approach. Guido Calabresi, for example, argues for a "common law" approach to the interpretation of
statutes whereby courts would adjust the meaning of statutes to
bring them into accord with the rest of the "legal topography"the accumulation of other statutes, constitutional decisions, and
administrative regulations.s9 The Supreme Court has affirmed
such an approach taken by the Internal Revenue Service in its
decision to withhold tax-exempt status from private schools that
52. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 47, at 1418 (emphasis added). See also Grimmet,
The Legislative Veto and US. Arms Sales, in STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO, supra
note 8, at 249, 255-59.
53. Bruff & Gellhorn. supra note 47, at 1420.
54. See, e.g., L. DODD & R. ScHOTT, CoNGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
95-104 (1979).
55. See, e.g., T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979).
56. See, e.g.. R. ARNOLD, supra note 48, at 66; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 47;
Miller & Knapp, supra note 19, at 376; L. DoDD & R. ScHoTT. supra note 54, at 229-35.
57. Martin, supra note 8, at 278-79.
58. See, e.g., E. LEVI, supra note 35, at 27-57.
59. G. CALABRESI. supra note 34.
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discriminate on the basis of race. Whatever the merits of this approach,60 not even its staunchest advocates contend that administrative agencies should settle for anything less than wellsupported, clearly stated, and enduring signals of a changed legislative intent.
What the legislative veto encourages, however, is responsiveness to a changed legislative intent that may be prompted by nothing more profound than a momentary shift in the mood of the
public, the proximity to an election, an altered composition of the
overseeing committee, the rise of a new and committed interest
group-a change of intent that would not be sufficient to stir the
passage of a law, but that would be adequate to affect administrative rules under the threat of a legislative veto.6I
Finally we should note the shift that the veto introduces in a
congressman's perspective about passing and implementing legislation. Without the veto, those who are intent upon achieving the
passage of legislation must think, and even educate their constituencies to think, in terms of the art of the possible. They must be
willing to accept compromises, accommodate divergent interests,
make trade-offs. The price of being excessively idealistic or overly
committed to an interest is ineffectiveness; and the congressman
must take the blame for that consequence. But knowing that they
will have the opportunity to protect themselves and their constituencies through the veto, congressmen are more likely to legislate
at a highly abstract and general level where compromises need not
be made and trade-offs need not be faced.62
Equally important to this expanded incentive and opportunity for avoiding trade-offs in the passage of legislation is what
David Martin has called "the luxury of being negative"63 in the
implementation of the law. That is, by placing the primary burden on the administrative agencies to put forward proposals, congressmen are free simply to point out what is wrong with any
given proposal rather than weighing the costs and benefits of this
proposal against other possibilities.64 This of course is not to say
60. See, e.g., Rabkin, Behind the Tax-Exempt Schools Debate, PuB. INTEREST. Summer 1982, at 21.
61. See L. Fl~HER, THE POLITICS Of SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 99 (1981).
62. See, e.g., Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload.
REG., Nov./Dec. 1979, at 19, 25. According to Louis Fisher "Congress delegates far
greater power with the legislative veto than it would without it." L. FISHER, supra note 61.
at 101.
63. Martin, supr.; note 8, at 267-74.
64. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST; A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
131-34 (1980).
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that congressmen invariably succumb to this temptation, but
whenever a tough trade-off appears, the veto permits them to declare themselves in favor of virtue and blame the administrative
agency for bringing forward its blemished proposal.
In sum, compared to the normal legislative process, the process with the veto eases the passage of laws, especially vague and
abstract ones, makes it more difficult to implement them in accordance with the original legislative intent (to the extent that it
can be determined), skews the operation of the law in favor of
narrow constituencies, makes the administration sensitive to evanescent moods of Congress, and encourages unrealistic moral posturing by congressmen.
In light of this comparison, we should re-examine how well
the legislative veto serves the ends of balance, energy, and accountability. Energy, or efficiency, is perhaps more properly spoken of as an end that the legislative veto preserves rather than
promotes. That is, the veto is designed to maintain the efficiency
of delegation of authority while permitting Congress to regain
control. It must be doubted, however, that that control has been
or really can be regained without some sacrifice of efficiency. If
the administrative agency develops its proposal in isolation from
Congress, there is serious danger of prompting a legislative veto
and coming to an impasse.6s On the other hand if the agency
works closely with the committee or subcommittee (or its stafi),
the process of negotiating rules must slow, to some extent, the development of proposals.66 Even if there is some loss of efficiency,
however, this would seem to be a small expense, if the gain were a
recovering of accountability and balance. But these ends are promoted only if they are understood in a debased sense.
Instead of promoting the idea of accountability to the will of
the people in the constitutional sense discussed above, one that
combines the virtues of the will of all and the general will, the
legislative veto fosters accountability to slender sectors of the electorate and to ephemeral moods. Madison spoke of the legislative
process as one in which representatives would "refine and enlarge" raw and narrow interests present in their constituencies.67
The normal process does tend to do this by forcing compromise
and accommodation.6s But the legislative veto encourages the
congressman, by virtue of the electoral advantage it affords, to ca65.
66.

See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 47, at 1410-12, 1426, 1432-33.
/d. at 1414-17.

67.
68.

/d.
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ter to the interests as they are given to him. And while Hamilton
affirmed "[t]he republican principle . . . that the deliberate sense
of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom
they intrust the management of their affairs," he also emphasized
that this "does not require an unqualified complaisance to every
sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the
people may receive . . . ."69
While the legislative veto may bring about a sort of restoration of the equilibrium between the President and Congress,1o it is
primarily through a power in Congress rather than a power of
Congress. That is, it gives power to subcommittees and individual
congressmen, especially in enhancing their electoral possibilities.
But only in rare instances can it be said to bring about a balance
between Congress as a body and the administration.
Balance, accountability, and energy are intermediate ends,
each serving in large part the higher end of liberty.?' Energy in
the government was deemed necessary to protect liberty from social disorder and foreign nations,n balance and accountability to
protect liberty from the government itself. n
The liberty protected by the Constitution has several levels
and many aspects. Most commonly one thinks of rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution. But liberal democracies
generally and the American polity in particular respect a general
right to "natural" liberty deriving from the contract theories of the
state.74 As a threshold condition for the circumscription of this
liberty by the federal government, the Constitution mandates, except implicitly for emergency situations,1s that there be a certain
level of agreement and commitment as these are formally indicated by the legislative requirements of bicameral support and
presentation to the president. This principle respects individuals
both in their capacity as subject and as citizen. It recognizes that
as a subject of the state the individual does legitimately fear governmental abuse, doubt the scope of governmental competence,
and deserve assurance that his liberty will not be casually circumscribed. The principle also recognizes that as a citizen of the state,
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
70. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 16; Dry, supra note 14; Javits & Klein, supra
note 4.
71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (A. Hamilton).
73. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (J. Madison).
74. See, e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123; J. ELY, supra note 64, at 134;
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT§ 22 (1690). But seeR. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266-78 ( 1977).
75. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 19, at 7-10.
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the individual participates in the selection of those people upon
whose authority alone76 this natural liberty is to be limited. And
this authority to circumscribe liberty through law also implies the
authority to maintain that law unless it is displaced or altered by
an equally authoritative act.
I have used the term "agreement" to emphasize that the formal requirements of legislation cannot be merely formal, but that
the framers did expect a meeting of minds as to the proper course
of action-not necessarily as to motives, but as to intent.? 7 Without this substantive expectation the formal requirements would be
without consequence.7s If "agreement" amounted to nothing
more than the identification of a difficult and politically charged
problem that the legislature would like someone else to handleto decide the questions of who will be burdened and who will be
benefited, to make the trade-o.ffs, to prescribe the actual rules of
conduct-then the carefully constructed procedures for rendering
the legislative process accountable to a complex notion of the will
of the people would be worthless. The process would protect
neither the individual's liberty as a subject of the state nor his authority as a citizen of the state. 79 The Constitution must envision
that there will be a discernable content to legislation,so an "intelligible principle"si to guide the administration of the law.
While "agreement" is a dimension emphasized by virtually
all writers who have dealt seriously with constitutional limits to
delegation, the constitutional concern for a level of commitment
behind legislation is less commonly noted. The framers hoped to
ensure that legislation would have behind it a level of commitment strong enough to be constant in abiding by the terms of the
agreement. Liberty was not to be circumscribed and released,
courses of conduct mandated then altered, burdens imposed then
See, e.g., 1. LOCKE, supra note 74, at § 141.
On the legitimacy and importance of the distinction between intent and motives.
see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH; THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
PoLITICS 208-220 ( 1962). But see Ely. Legislative and Administrative Motivall?n In Conslitulional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-22 (1970).
78. This seems to have been the ground of Locke's concern, supra note 74.
79. Arguably, citizenship is not affronted when elected lawmakers choose to delegate
their tasks to others, as the lawmakers remain ultimately accountable to the people. The
point would be valid if citizenship were a matter of democratic sovereignty, for complete
sovereignty should logically entail the capacity to alienate authority. But if qualified sovereignty itself arises from an understanding of citizenship that rests upon individual dignity
and individual duty and which vests those qualities in the elected representatives of the
people, then there is indeed an affront to citizenship in the delegation of essential authority.
For the delegation itself violates the qualities of dignity and duty.
·
80. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 48 (1958).
81. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
76.
77.
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lifted according to blips of approval and disapproval in "perpetual
vibration." 82 Law was not to be the product, in Burke's phrase, of
a "momentary aggregation," but to emerge from a partnership
"between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who
are to be born." Repeatedly, throughout the Federalist, one finds
a constitutional commitment to commitment, a concern that a
course not be embarked upon unless it is with a seriousness to see
it through. This concern with a community through time as well
as space is seen in the staggered scheme of representation, with
members chosen from three distinct periods over the last six years,
and in the relatively lengthy terms of office for senators8J and the
president. 84 These people, by virtue of their terms of office could
have both the incentive and the capacity to follow through on a
course of action. Indeed some of the most forceful and critical
language in the Federalist papers is directed towards the "mischiefs of . . . inconstancy and mutability in the laws." These,
Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 73, "form the greatest blemish in
the character and genius of our governments."ss Madison tells us
that "the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a
volume." Assuming that there was more than adequate experience with the problem, Madison chose to "hint a few only, each of
which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others."
Two of these are of special relevance here. First, a mutable policy
"poisons the blessings of liberty itself," by making the laws "so
incoherent that they cannot be understood." "Law," he writes, "is
defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is
little known, and less fixed?"86 "[T]he most deplorable effect of
all," however, is this:
[T)hat diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the
people towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and
disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an
individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable, nor be truly
respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and stability. 87

Madison only "hints" the flow of reasoning, but it follows from
this that a government that is wanting in respectability is wanting
in authority. This argument does not imply that one has a right of
civil disobedience against any law that is passed without the requisite level of commitment, but it certainly implies that a process
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

THE FEDERALIST No.9, at 71 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62 & 63 (J. Madison).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (A. Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 444 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 380-81 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
/d. at 382.
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of law differing from that clearly established by the Constitution
which lowers the level of commitment likely to accompany law is
a process that should be viewed with suspicion.
When Congress includes a veto provision in legislation, it is
actually withholding its legislative authority.ss The completion of
this authority occurs when Congress acquiesces in an administrative proposal, putatively designed to implement the original legislative act. Some commentators have spoken of this as a
delegation of authority from Congress to itself,s9 or to a portion of
itself. But since the legislative authority never fully leaves Congress until the moment of acquiescence, it seems more accurate to
refer to the initial act of including the legislative veto, not as a
delegation of authority but as a reservation of authority.9o
Advocates of the veto have spoken of this acquiescence as a
"condition precedent" to legal effect.9I And indeed there are numerous examples of legislative authority being "conditioned"
upon the occurrence of an event.92 The favored example is Currin
v. Wallace, 93 where federal market controls on tobacco farming
were to go into effect only if two-thirds of the growers in the affected districts voted in favor of having the regulations apply. If
approval by tobacco farmers is an acceptable condition precedent
to legal effect, then surely the approval of Congress should be.
But legislative acquiescence is distinct from other conditions
precedent to legal effect in the very important sense that in all
other cases the will of the Congress is complete.94 When Congress
88. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 16, at 338.
89. See, e.g.. Henry. The Legis/alive Ve1o: In Search of Cons1i1u1ional Limils, 16
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735, 753 (1979).
90. On the basis of this characterization, Edward S. Corwin gave the legislative veto
the benefit of his prestige. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957
at 130 (4th ed. 1957); see also Cooper & Cooper, The Legis/alive Velo and 1he Conslilulion,
30 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 467 (1962); and Abourezk, supra note 16.
91. See Abourezk, supra note 16, at 327, 337; Cooper & Cooper, supra note 90, at
473-74; E. CoRWIN, supra note 90, at 130; Dry. supra note 14, at 205, 209.
92. Such as authorization of a schedule of duties on imported goods being conditioned upon "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties laid on American goods by
foreign governments. C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION !54 (3rd ed. !977).
93. 306 U.S. I (1939). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944);
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892).
94. The Currin opinion itself implied an understanding of this distinction, by emphasizing the nonlegislative character of the farmers' vote: "While in a sense one may say that
such residents are exercising legislative power, it is not an exact statement, because the
power has already been exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power under
the Constitution . . . . " 306 U.S. I, 16 (1939).
Others have pointed to the distinctive character of making congressional action or
inaction a "condition precedent" to legal effect, but have criticized it for reasons other than
that given here. J. HARRIS, supra note 6. at 241, contends that making the "condition
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enacts a law with a legislative veto its will is incomplete. It is
saying in effect "we will that proposals issued under the heading
of this bill become law if at a later time we will that they become
law." On a given bill or a given proposal there may be present
through these two expressions of will the level of agreement and
commitment that the Constitution holds as a minimal condition
for the authoritative charting of human conduct; but the logic and
evidence of congressional action indicate that frequently that is
not the case.
Exactly because there is the chance for a second look, for arresting the implementation of the provision one most dislikes, for
checking an implication that one did not initially take time to consider, for pressing the bureaucracy for an implementation most
favorable to one's interest-for these reasons and others it takes
less agreement and commitment for a proposal to gain the support
of both houses.9s And further, as indicated in the above analysis,
the second expression of support is mere acquiescence,96 it is given
only on an aspect rather than the whole of the legislation, it is
probably given by a Congress of different composition and interests than the one that approved the initial act, and it is likely to be
effectively granted by a committee or subcommittee rather than
the whole of Congress.97 What would have prompted a veto of
precedent" to legal effect an action or inaction of Congress injects the legislative will into
the sphere of executive authority. permitting it to "set aside or to reverse executive deci·
sions'' in a manner other than that authorized by the Constitution-that is, the normal
legislative process. The flaw with this analysis is the assumption that the legislative veto
voids something already having the status of law.
David Martin's analysis, supra note 8, is based less on formal interference with the
executive authority than on functional pathologies. His argument is that when the condition precedent to legal effect is congressional approval, the legislature involves itself so
deeply in implementation of the law that it develops a vested interest and thus renders itself
less competent to assess the workings of the law--something that does not occur if the
condition is an event or the expression of will apart from congressional assent. While this
analysis invokes a more accurate characterization of the legislative veto. it misses the essence of the problem. First, whenever Congress enacts law, it is identified with the consequence; involvement with the so-called (but not formally accurate) implementation might
increase the identification. but so would the writing of more specific legislation. And surely
legislation that is vague cannot be constitutionally preferred to legislation that is explicit.
Second. this criticism seems at odds with the rest of Martin's analysis, which stresses that
legislative vetoes allow congressmen to distance their initial legislative acts from later administrative proposals.
95. See, e.g., L. FISHER, supra note 61, at 101.
96. Silence may be golden in some spheres, but it has never counted for much in
legislative interpretation. See E. LEVI, supra note 35. at 27-57. And when the Court has
attended to the supposed will of a Congress that is "silently vocal," bizarre consequences
have sometimes ensued. See Powell, The Sri// Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, m 3
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 931 ( 1938).
97. See, e.g.. Fisher & Moe. supra note 18, at 316; Bruff & Gellhom. supra note 47, at
1417-20.
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the first body may slide past the second, even though it would not
have had sufficient support to pass as law.9s And what not only
would have gained the acquiescence of the initial body, but its
affirmative approval, may now be vetoed.99 There will thus be
instances where a proposal should have become law, having sufficient agreement and commitment-at least as a part of a larger
package or a means to an articulated end in the initial legislative
act-but instead was blocked. In such cases the proposal's supporters were cheated of an action to which they were entitled, and
the authority of the individual as citizen was diminished. But the
even more serious problem is in legislative acquiescence. Too
often liberty will be circumscribed, courses of conduct will be authoritatively charted, benefits and burdens will be distributed
without the level of support that is the norm under the legislative
process without the legislative veto.
We deal, of course, with probabilities. There is no absolute
guarantee that legislation passed under the normal legislative process will have behind it more agreement and commitment than
legislation passed through a process that includes the legislative
veto. But if anything is clear from the structure of the Constitution it is that the legislative process is designed so that there will
be a strong probability that the law will have a high degree of
agreement and commitment behind it. It is also clear that the legislative process with the legislative veto lowers that threshold requirement of agreement and commitment.
Ill.

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

If there was a single common ground between the majority
opinion and Justice White's elaborate dissent in Chadha, it was
that Congress had authority to delegate vast authority. The majority reasoned that Congress may delegate authority, but "must
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked."1oo Justice White argued that since
Congress could delegate authority (court-enforced restrictions
having disappeared-in his mind appropriately soioi), "it is most
98. A possible example is the use of racial quotas in the absence of proven legal or
constitutional violations. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
219-55 (1979) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting).
99. Legislative vetoes have the same objectionable effect on the president's veto
power. When a bill contains a legislative veto provision, the president cannot fully evaluate the measure because its contents cannot be fully known; they are a mere prediction of
what Congress will choose to do.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
101. See id. at 2801-02 (White, J., dissenting).
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difficult to understand Article I as forbidding Congress from also
reserving a check on legislative power for itself."w2 Further, he
wrote:
If the effective functioning of a complex modern government requires the delega-

tion of vast authority which, by virtue of its breadth, is legislative or "quasi-legislative" in character, I cannot accept that Article !-which is, after all, the source
of the non-delegation doctrine~hould forbid Congress from qualifying that
grant with a legislative veto.l03

White's reasoning seems to have linked the concepts correctly. If Congress can delegate, it can veto. If Congress can delegate "vast authority," then my analysis, while correctly identifying
the fault with the legislative veto, must be said to make too much
of it. The analysis is concerned with the mere formalities of legislation. While these formalities in the Constitution and republican
government may once have respected a general right to liberty in
the way I have maintained, they no longer do; that respect is no
longer practicable for the "effective functioning of a complex
modem government." If Congress can delegate vast, vague, and
essentially standardless authority to the administrative agencies,
identifying only the problem to be solved,104 leaving it up to the
administrative agency to determine the sort of liberty that should
be circumscribed and the course of human conduct that should be
charted, then it is idle to speak of the legislative process maintaining certain standards of agreement and commitment. It would be
anomalous to insist upon the unconstitutionality of the legislative
veto and to let pass "vast" delegations of legislative authority. If
the above analysis is correct, however, then the Court's result in
Chadha should render suspect such delegation.
Even though the nondelegation doctrine and what might be
called the nonreservation doctrine respect the same underlying
right to liberty, courts will have to approach the two doctrines differently, for the simple reason that a reservation of authority is
easy to identify, while an excessive delegation of authority is not.
In resurrecting the nondelegation doctrine then, courts will have
to proceed cautiously on a case by case basis, rather than with a
single dramatic decision as for the legislative veto.
Nevertheless, the theory proposed in this article does suggest
the appropriate starting point: the idea of an "intelligible principle." los If government must respect a general right to liberty, so
102. !d. at 2802.
103. !d. at 2804.
104. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 2.05 (1958).
105. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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that only upon a certain level of agreement and commitment can
it abridge that liberty, there must be something intelligible to
which the representatives are agreeing. The idea of an intelligible
principle also finds support in the idea that the duty of Congress is
to "make law." If law is to be, as Madison wrote, a "rule of action," 106 then it must have an intelligible principle. No doubt it is
too simplistic today to insist that the legislature's province is to
make law and not to make lawmakers.I07 To provide adequate
guidance to citizens about what is lawful and what is not, to adapt
a principle to varied and rapidly changing environments, to discover and assess the facts that are conditions for the implementation of legislation-all of this requires legislators created by
Congress whom we call civil servants or executive officers. But at
the same time that Congress creates lawmakers, it is not too much
to ask that it also make law, that is, to require that Congress supply "rules of conduct," or "intelligible principles," to direct their
lawmaking.
The idea of a conditional general right to liberty also suggests
a better route to the revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine
than others that have been articulated in recent years. While perhaps the most powerful recent argument in favor of a revitalized
rule of nondelegation is based ultimately on a concept of duty, 1os
it seems preferable in a liberal democracy to seek ultimate
groundings in individual rights, from which, of course, duties
should be inferred. The idea of a general right to liberty subject to
abridgment upon a certain level of agreement and commitment
does this.
This right seems a more plausible ground for supporting the
nondelegation doctrine than other justifications based on individual rights which have been brought forward in recent years. Arguments have been constructed from a right to due processl09 and
equal protection,110 but it seems possible to meet these concerns
completely without limiting Congress's authority to delegate authority. All that is necessary is that the administrative agency develop clear enough rules to give fair notice about what is lawful
106. THE fEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 86, at 381.
107. See J. LOCKE, supra note 74, at § 141.
108. See S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
POWER 36-51 ( 1975 ).
109. See Cushman. The Consuturional Srarus of rhe /ndependenr Regu/arory Commissions, 24 CORNELL l.Q. 13, 32-33 ( 1938).
110. See Wilson, Unsrrucrured Delegarion of Legis/alive Power and rhe Modern Bureaucrauc Srare: Can and Should rhe Brig Aurora be Safe(v Brough! Back info Harbor.~
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver,
Colo. (Sept. 2-5, 1982).
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and what is not and to prevent favoritism in dealing with parties
similarly situated.'''
Finally, the concept of a nondelegation doctrine, arising from
a general right to liberty, is compatible with the recent decisions
hinting at a sliding scale of permissible delegation, that is, as legislation approaches the frontier of an individual right, the courts
have required greater clarity of purpose.112 If the closer the law
approaches a fundamental right, the more specific it must be, then
it reasonably follows that some degree of specificity is required
before there is abridgment of a general right to liberty.
IV.

CONCLUSION: SLOUCHING TOWARD
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY

Neither by delegating essential legislative authority nor by reserving it to itself can Congress fulfill its constitutional duty to
legislate. By slouching toward rather than performing its constitutional duty, Congress has brought into being a regime so cavalier
towards the general right to liberty and the commitments of citizenship, so distinct from the guiding principles of the Constitution, that the most recent edition of a famous inquiry into the
nature of public authority in America''3 now concludes that we
live under the "Second Republic of the United States." Perhaps
overly dramatic, the conclusion, by pointing to the change in regime rather than "social and economic forces," does properly emphasize the role of deliberate human choice.''4
Although legislative vetoes and delegations of essentially
standardless authority are not inevitable responses to modem social and economic circumstances, they have given congressmen
such electoral advantages that it would be foolishly sanguine to
expect reform to come from Congress itself. Positioned above the
ordinary political process, endowed with the tools of a tradition,
and charged with constitutional responsibility, it is up to the Court
to make the deliberate choices that will bring constitutional form
to, and hence make respectable,11s the currently uncouth legislative process which prevails through delegation and reservation of
authority. While the Court chose correctly in Chadha, it articulated poorly. Proper reflection on that decision, however, should
Ill. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE; A PRELIMINARY iNQUIRY 217-19 (1969).
112. See. e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 ( 1958).
113. See T. Lowi, supra note 55.
114. On the "debilitating" effect of attributing problems to an anthropomorphized "society," see E. BRANN, PARADOXES OF EDUCATION I!'< A REPUBLIC 2-3 (1979).
i 15. See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text.
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lead the Justices to see the logical necessity of revitalizing the doctrine of nondelegation.

